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Putting Flesh on the Skeleton:
South African Judicial
Enforcement of the Right to




Access to adequate housing is one of the greatest challenges facing the
South African government today. The country’s housing situation is
characterised by a severe housing shortage, a huge backlog in the pro-
vision of housing, provision of inadequate housing and severe over-
crowding in existing dwellings. In addition, evictions that at times
result in homelessness are a daily occurrence. The government has put
in place a number of legislative and other measures aimed at realising
the right to adequate housing. However, the difficulty that remains is
translating these laws and policies into reality, resulting in safe, secure
and affordable living conditions for the poor and vulnerable. This article
examines how South African courts have sought to enforce the right
to adequate housing of those faced with evictions through interpreting
the constitutional provision on this right and the corresponding state
duty, while at the same time, protecting the rights of landowners.
1. Introduction
The right to adequate housing is of central importance for the enjoyment of
all socio-economic rights, as well as other human rights. It includes, amongst
others, the right to protection from arbitrary or unlawful interference with
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privacy, family or home and to legal security of tenure.1 It therefore mirrors
a prohibition of forced or arbitrary eviction.2 Every state has a legal obligation to
respect, protect, promote and fulfil the right to adequate housing, and by infer-
ence not to sponsor, tolerate or carry out forced evictions.3 The obligations of
states in this regard arise from several international instruments protecting the
right to adequate housing and other related human rights.4 States are required
to adopt appropriate legislative and policy measures to ensure the protection of
individuals, groups and communities against evictions that are not in confor-
mity with existing human rights standards.5 In other words, states must ensure
that the right to adequate housing and secure tenure and the protection against
forced evictions are guaranteed without discrimination of any kind.
Several international bodies have developed consistent standards unequivo-
cally stating that forced evictions constitute grave violations of human rights,
especially the right to adequate housing. For instance, the United Nations
(UN) Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), in expand-
ing on the meaning of the right to adequate housing under Article 11 of the
ICESCR, placed considerable emphasis on forced evictions. The CESCR noted
that ‘forced evictions are prima facie incompatible with the requirements of
the Covenant’.6 Also, the UN Commission on Human Rights (replaced by the
Human Rights Council) held that the practice of forced eviction constitutes a
gross violation of human rights especially the right to adequate housing.7
1 See generally, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) General Comment
No. 4,The right to adequate housing, 13 December 1991, E/1992/23.
2 155/96, Social and Economic Rights Action Centre and the Centre for Economic and Social Rights v
Nigeria 15th Annual Activity Report of the ACHPR (2002); 10 IHRR 282 (2003) (SERAC) at
para. 61.
3 UN Fact Sheet No.25, Forced Evictions andHumanRights,23 June1993, A/CONF.157/24 at part1,
chap. III, available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet25en.pdf [last
accessed 28 January 2008]. See also UN Fact Sheet No. 21, The Human Right to Adequate
Housing, available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet21en.pdf [last
accessed 28 January 2008].
4 Article 25, Universal Declaration on Human Rights 1948, GA Res.217A (III), 10 December
1948, A/810 (UDHR); Article 11(1), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (ICESCR); Article 14(2)(h) Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Discrimination against Women 1979, 1249 UNTS 13 (CEDAW); Article 5(e)(iii),
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination 1965, 660 UNTS 195
(CERD); and Article 27(3), Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989, 1577 UNTS 3 (CRC).
Although the right to housing is not explicitly provided for under the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights 1981, 27 June 1981, OAU CAB/LEG/67/3rev.5; 21 ILM 58 (1982)
(African Charter), the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African
Commission), the supervisory body of the African Charter, has found the right to be implicit
in Articles 14 (right to property), 16 (right to the best attainable state of physical and mental
health) and 18(1) (protection of the family), read together: Social and Economic Rights Action
Centre and the Centre for Economic and Social Rights v Nigeria, supra n. 2 at para. 60.
5 See generally, CESCR General Comment No. 3, The nature of states parties obligations,
14 December 1990, E/1991/23.
6 General Comment No. 4, supra n. 1 at para. 18.
7 Res. 2004/28, Prohibition of Forced Evictions, 16 April 2004, E/2004/23-E/CN.4/2004/127,
chap. X at para. 1. See also Res. 1993/77, Forced Evictions, 10 March 1993, at para. 1.
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In addition, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African
Commission) has observed that forced evictions have a drastic impact on peo-
ples’socio-economic, physical and psychological well being, increasing existing
levels of homelessness.8 In the words of the African Commission: ‘Wherever
and whenever they occur, forced evictions are extremely traumatic. They
cause physical, psychological and emotional distress; they entail losses of
means of economic sustenance and increase impoverishment. They can also
cause physical injury and in some cases sporadic deaths . . . Evictions break up
families and increase existing levels of homelessness.’9
Despite these adverse effects, globally, millions of people are forcibly evicted
on a yearly basis, leaving them homeless and, in the process, entrenching
patterns of poverty, discrimination and sexual exclusion.10 These are often
large-scale evictionsçentire communities of tens or even hundreds of thou-
sands of people are removed. They are invariably evicted against their will, in
most cases without any compensation or alternative housing.11 In Africa, forced
evictions, with or without judicial backing, have increased at an alarming rate.
Between 2003 and 2006, an estimated 2,004,171people were evicted.12 In most
instances, those evicted are left homeless, losing their possessions without com-
pensation or are forcibly displaced far from sources of employment, livelihood
or education, all in violation of international human rights law.13
South Africa, though hailed for its progressive housing laws, jurisprudence,
policies and programmes, is not free of this crisis. The practice of evictions
is a regular occurrence in the country, in both urban and rural areas.
Between 1995 and 2005, 826,679 people were reportedly evicted.14 As seen
Similarly, the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities has stated, on several occasions, that the practice of forced eviction constitutes a
gross violation of a broad range of human rights, particularly the right to adequate housing:
see Res. 1993/36, Promoting the realization of the right to adequate housing, 25 August 1993;
Res. 1993/41, Forced evictions, 26 August 1993; and Res. 1994/39, Forced evictions, 26 August
1994, available at: http://ww2.unhabitat.org/programmes/housingrights/unhrp_resolutions.
asp [last accessed 22 November 2007].
8 South Africa ratified the African Charter on 9 July 1996.
9 Social and Economic Rights Action Centre and the Centre for Economic and Social Rights v Nigeria,
supra n. 2 at para. 63.
10 Du Plessis, ‘Forced Evictions, Development and the Need for Community-Based, Locally
Appropriate Alternative: Lessons and Challenges from South Africa, Ghana and Thailand’, in
Huchzermeyer and Karam (eds), Informal Settlements: A Perpetual Challenge? (Johannesburg:
UCT Press, 2006) 180 at 180.
11 Du Plessis, ‘Forced Evictions: A Global Perspective’, (2006) 7(3) ESR Review 3 at 3.
12 See generally, Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE), ‘Forced Evictions^Violations
of Human Rights’, (2006) 10 Global Survey 11, available at: http://www.cohre.org/view_
page.php?page_id¼119 [last accessed 22 November 2007]. See also COHRE, ‘Focus on Africa’,
August 2005, 1(3) Evictions Monitor, available at: http://www.cohre.org/view_page.
php?page_id¼176 [last accessed 22 November 2007].
13 Amnesty International, Public Statement, Africa: Forced Evictions are a Human Rights Scandal,
3 October 2005, AI Index: AFR 01/003/2005, available at: http://web.amnesty.org/library/
Index/ENGAFR010032005 [last accessed 22 November 2007].
14 Du Plessis, supra n. 11 at 6. See also, Wegerif, Russell and Grundling, Still Searching for
Security. The Reality of Farm Dweller Evictions in South Africa (Polkwane North: Nkuzi
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below, legislation and policies aimed at providing procedural and substantive
protection to people faced with evictions have been enacted or adopted.
However, the complexity of legislation on eviction and its allowance of urgent
eviction applications, more often than not result in evictions taking place with-
out adherence to the procedural and substantive requirements. The poorest
and most vulnerable members of the society are evicted without being
given an opportunity to present their case in court (or oppose the eviction) or
adequate notice of when the eviction order will be carried out; with some of
the eviction orders executed at night.15 Others have been evicted without the
provision of alternative accommodation.16 Hence, evictions often occur in a
manner that is incompatible with the fundamental values of respect for
human rights; resulting in the violation of, inter alia, the rights to dignity,
health, security of the person, livelihood and adequate housing. The courts
have, accordingly, sought to enforce the right to adequate housing of those
faced with evictions; while at the same time, protecting the rights of
landowners.
The aim of this article is to show how South African courts have strived in
ensuring greater protection for those faced with evictions, through interpret-
ing the constitutional rights to adequate housing and to protection against
arbitrary evictions, and the corresponding state duty. Though reference is also
made to the decisions of other courts, the focus is mainly on the jurisprudence
of the Constitutional Court, which is the highest court in all constitutional
matters. The article also examines, albeit briefly, how the courts, in the process
of protecting those faced with evictions, have given consideration to the var-
ious interests involved, in particular, the rights of landowners. These issues
are considered against the international, historical and legal context, as the
Constitutional Court has, on numerous instances, emphasised that the rights
in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (the Constitution)
cannot be interpreted in the abstract but in the light of their context.17
Development Association, and Johannesburg: Social Surveys, December 2005).With regard to
farm dwellers, between 1994 and 2004, 1,679,417 farm dwellers were reportedly evicted: see
Wegerif, ‘Farm Evictions: A Failure of Rights’ (2006) 7 ESR Review 8 at 9.
15 UN Press Release, Statement of the UN Special Rapporteur, Miloon Kothari, on Adequate
Housing in light of his Mission to South Africa (12 April to 24 April 2007), 7 May 2007.
16 South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC), 6th Economic and Social Rights Report:
2003^2006 (Johannesburg: South African Human Rights Commission, 2006) at 6.
17 For instance, in Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA
46 (CC) at para. 25, the Court stated that rights need to be interpreted and understood in
their social and historical context. The Grootboom case concerned a number of people, includ-
ing children, who had moved from an informal settlement onto private land earmarked for
low-cost housing owing to the ‘appalling conditions’ in which they were living. They were
evicted from the private land, which they were unlawfully occupying. Following the eviction,
they camped on a sports field in the area and approached the courts to enforce their right of
access to adequate housing. They alleged that the state’s housing programme violated their
right to have access to adequate housing guaranteed under Section 26, Constitution. The
respondents in this case also sought to enforce their children’s right to shelter under Section
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2. International Standards on Evictions
South Africa has a range of housing (and housing-related) obligations in terms
of international human rights instruments that guarantee the right to ade-
quate housing. The obligations include recognising the right to adequate hous-
ing, including the right to be protected from arbitrary evictions, through the
ratification of international treaties, as well as not only including housing
rights and the prohibition of arbitrary evictions in the Constitution and other
housing legislation but also enforcing them.
International standards on evictions are relevant because South African
courts cannot completely disregard international law provisions and subsequent
interpretations. Section 39(1) of the Constitution requires the courts to consider
international law when interpreting the rights in the Constitution. Also,
Section 233 of the Constitution requires every court, when interpreting
any legislation, to give preference to any reasonable interpretation of the legisla-
tion that is consistent with international law. As observed by the Constitutional
Court, international law and standards in non-binding international instru-
ments provides a framework within which the rights in the Constitution can be
evaluated and understood.18 Accordingly, the courts have referred to interna-
tional law when construing the right to adequate housing in eviction cases,
though the weight attached to any rule of international law varies from case to
case.19 If the relevant principle or rule of international law binds South Africa,
it may be directly applicable. But where it is not directly binding, though it
could be relied on by the courts, its impact will be limited where significant diff-
erences exist in the wordings of the provisions of the international instrument
and the provisions of the Constitution, as is the case with the ICESCR and the
Constitution as regards the right to adequate housing.20
The right to adequate housing, as guaranteed in the ICESCR, has been
elaborated upon by the CESCR in General Comment No. 4.21 The relevant gen-
eral comments on the interpretation and application of the ICESCR are
28(1)(c), Constitution. Basically, when ruling in their favour, the Court held that the obliga-
tion imposed on the state is to put in place a reasonable programme, subject to available
resources, to realise the right of access to adequate housing. Regarding the children, it held
that the primary obligation to provide for children’s needs lies with their parents and on the
state only when such children have been removed from the care of parents.
18 See S v Makwanyaye and Another1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at para. 35, which concerned the consti-
tutionality of the death penalty.
19 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom, supra n. 17 at para. 26.
20 The ICESCR provides for ‘a right to adequate housing’ while the Constitution, as interpreted,
provides for ‘the right of access to adequate housing’.
21 Supra n. 1. Article 11(1), ICESCR reads:
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an ade-
quate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing
and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. The States
Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to
this effect the essential importance of international co-operation based on free consent.
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important and useful for the courts in interpreting the right to adequate hous-
ing in the South African context. Actually, the Constitutional Court has relied
directly on, for example, General Comment No. 3 of the CESCR. As seen subse-
quently, it has endorsed a passage from it on the meaning of ‘progressive real-
isation’ in the context of the Constitution.22 In General Comment No. 4, the
CESCR identified a number of factors to be taken into account in determining
whether particular forms of shelter can be considered to constitute ‘adequate
housing’ for the purposes of the ICESCR. These include: legal security of
tenure; availability of services materials, facilities and infrastructure; afford-
ability; habitability; accessibility; location; and cultural adequacy.23 The
CESCR added that ‘all persons should possess a degree of security of tenure
which guarantees legal protection against forced eviction, harassment and
other threats’.24
The CESCR has been more specific in relation to due process in the context
of evictions. It has identified procedural requirements to be applied in the
case of an eviction, which have been useful to South African courts when
interpreting the right to protection against arbitrary evictions. These include:
(a) an opportunity for genuine consultation with those affected;
(b) adequate and reasonable notice for all affected persons prior to the
scheduled date of eviction; (c) information on the proposed evictions,
and, where applicable, on the alternative purpose for which the land or
housing is to be used, to be made available in reasonable time to all
those affected; (d) especially where groups of people are involved, govern-
ment officials or their representatives to be present during an eviction;
(e) all persons carrying out the eviction to be properly identified;
(f) evictions not to take place in particularly bad weather or at night
unless the affected persons consent otherwise; (g) provision of legal
remedies; and (h) provision, where possible, of legal aid to persons who
are in need of it to seek redress from the courts.25
The CESCR is also of the view that evictions should not result in individuals
being rendered homeless or vulnerable to the violation of other human rights.
Prior to an eviction and particularly those involving large groups, states have
an obligation to explore all feasible alternatives in consultation with the
affected persons, with a view to avoiding, or at least minimising, the need to
use force.26 The state also has an obligation to ensure that adequate alternative
22 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom supra n. 17 at para. 45.
23 General Comment No. 4, supra n. 1 at para. 8.
24 Ibid. at para. 8a.
25 CESCR General Comment No. 7, Right to adequate housing: Forced evictions, 1997, E/1998/22,
Annex IVat para. 15.
26 Ibid. at para. 13.
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housing, resettlement or access to productive land, as the case may be, is avail-
able to affected persons who are unable to provide for themselves.27
The UN Commission on Human Rights has urged governments to immedi-
ately undertake measures at all levels aimed at eliminating the practice of
forced eviction by, amongst others, repealing existing plans involving forced
evictions as well as any legislation allowing for forced evictions, and byadopting
and implementing legislation ensuring the right to security of tenure for all resi-
dents.28 Governments are also required to adopt all necessary measures giving
full protection against forced eviction, based upon effective participation, con-
sultation and negotiation with affected persons or groups.29 They are further
required to provide appropriate and sufficient alternative accommodation or
land to persons and communities that have been forcibly evicted, following
mutually satisfactory negotiations with the affected persons or groups and con-
sistent with their wishes, rights and needs.30 It added that governments must
ensure that ‘any eviction that is otherwise deemed lawful is carried out in a
manner that does not violate any of the human rights of those evicted’.31
Furthermore, guidelines have been developed in relation to evictions linked
to development. In 1997, the guidelines on development-based displacement
were adopted.32 The guidelines place obligations on states, inter alia, to secure
by all appropriate means, including the provision of security of tenure, the
maximum degree of effective protection against the practice of forced
evictions for all persons; to prevent homelessness; and to explore all possible
alternatives to any act involving forced eviction. The need to further
strengthen and put forward in more operational terms the above guidelines
has resulted in the development of the Basic Principles and Guidelines on
Development-Based Evictions and Displacement (Basic Principles and
Guidelines), aimed at assisting states and the international community in sig-
nificantly reducing the practice of forced evictions.33 The Basic Principles and
Guidelines enumerate, inter alia, detailed steps to be taken by states prior to,
during, and after evictions.34 The procedural requirements prior to and
during evictions are similar to those stated by the CESCR in General
27 Ibid. at para. 16.
28 Supra n. 7 at para. 2. The UN Sub Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights has also urged governments to undertake immediate measures, at all levels, aimed at
eliminating the practice of forced evictions: see Res. 1992/14, 27 August 1992.
29 Ibid. at para. 3.
30 Ibid. at para. 4.
31 Ibid. at para. 5.
32 Expert Seminar on the Practice of Forced Evictions, Comprehensive Human Rights Guidelines
on Development-Based Displacement, 11^13 June 1997, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/7.
33 See Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to
an adequate standard of living, Miloon Kothari, 5 February 2007, A/HRC/4/18, Annex 1. The
Basic Principles and Guidelines are the result of an International Workshop on Forced
Evictions organised by the Special Rapporteur together with the German Federal Foreign
Office and the German Institute for Human Rights, Berlin, June 2005.
34 Ibid. at paras 37^58.
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Comment No. 7. For instance, after an eviction, the state or other parties
responsible have an immediate obligation to provide just compensation
and sufficient alternative accommodation, or restitution when feasible.35
Furthermore, at the very minimum, regardless of the circumstances and with-
out discrimination, the government must ensure that evicted persons or
groups, especially those who are unable to provide for themselves, have safe
and secure access to:
(a) essential food, potable water and sanitation; (b) basic shelter and
housing; (c) appropriate clothing; (d) essential medical services; (e) liveli-
hood sources; (f) fodder for livestock and access to common property
resources previously depended upon; and (g) education for children and
childcare facilities.36
States are also required to ensure that members of the same extended family or
community are not separated as a result of eviction; and ensure equal partici-
pation of women in all planning services and in the distribution of basic ser-
vices and supplies.37
The UN Special Rapporteur on adequate housing has urged states to incor-
porate the Basic Principles and Guidelines into national laws and policies.38
These guidelines would be very useful for South Africa as recent evictions,
especially in the inner city of Johannesburg, are development-related. As part
of the City of Johannesburg’s (the Municipality) effort to mould Johannesburg
into an ‘African World Class City’, in 2003 it launched its Inner City
Regeneration Strategy (ICRS). The strategy involves, inter alia, the identification
of ‘bad buildings’ (urban slums) with the intention of closing them down.
Thousands of desperately poor people are forced to illegally occupy such build-
ingsçclose to basic services and livelihood opportunitiesçbecause they
cannot afford accommodation on the private residential housing market or
afford access to the urban social housing units. Most of these poor people
have either no income whatsoever or earn less than R1,000 per month.39
Closing down these buildings implies the eviction of large numbers of
desperately poor people with little effective notice and without the provision
of alternative accommodation.40 The eviction applications are often moved on
an urgent basis, using apartheid-era laws and regulations, with as little as
35 Ibid. at para. 52.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid. at paras 52^3.
38 See Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to
an adequate standard of living, Miloon Kothari, 5 February 2007, A/HRC/4/18 at paras 4
and 33(d).
39 See generally, COHRE, Any Room for the Poor? Forced Evictions in Johannesburg, South Africa
(2005) at 48 and 56, available at: http://cohre.org/view_page.php?page_id¼120#235 [last
accessed 22 November 2007].
40 Wilson, ‘A New Dimension to the Right to Housing’ (2006) 7 ESR Review 9 at 10.
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10 days between the Municipality filing its eviction papers and an eviction
order being granted. Hence, the eviction applications are often unopposed,
since occupiers of bad buildings are usually all people lacking in resources,
and are unable to access quality legal representation. South African courts, as
well as courts in other countries, would therefore be well advised to take cogni-
sance of the Basic Principles and Guidelines and other international standards
on evictions in addressing the issue of development-related evictions.41
3. Housing Rights and Evictions in South Africa
A. Historical Context
Housing rights in South Africa must be understood against the legacy of apart-
heid and deep social inequality. To a large extent, apartheid laws and policies
have contributed to the unremitting occurrence of evictions and the housing
crisis in general. The apartheid government had grossly unequal approaches
to housing for each race group. Millions of people were arbitrarily evicted on
a regular basis from informal settlements as a result of so-called ‘influx con-
trol’ policies.42 The Slums Act 53 of 1934, for instance, was used to evict
people on health and safety grounds from the inner City of Johannesburg
with the provision of alternative housing only to white slum dwellers; though
the evictions affected all races.43 The Group Areas Act 41 of 1950 and its suc-
ceeding Acts resulted in people, particularly blacks, being evicted from their
homes without any compensation and being relocated to remote, racially
defined areas that deprived them of work and educational opportunities. The
Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act 52 of 1951 (PISA) allowed landowners to
demolish structures on their land and evict people without a court order. In
addition, housing subsidy schemes were racially divided, poorly targeted and
inadequately funded.44
Despite the abolition of influx control in the mid-1980s and the introduction
of new policies and approaches with regard to housing in post-apartheid
South Africa, apartheid’s legacy remains strongly tenacious.45 With reference
41 Recently, occupiers of ‘bad buildings’ have challenged several aspects of the City’s practice of
forced evictions, which is discussed subsequently. The amici curiae (the Community Law
Centre and the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions) in their submission brought the
Court’s attention to the Basic Principles and Guidelines.
42 Brand ‘Introduction to Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa’, in Brand and Heyns (eds)
Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa (Pretoria: University Law Press, 2005) 1 at 30.
43 COHRE, supra n. 39 at 14^15. The study captures the extent and nature of Johannesburg
inner city evictions and the lives of people living in ‘bad buildings’.
44 Chenwi, ‘Housing Rights’, in Khoza (ed.), The Resource Book, Socio-Economic Rights in South
Africa, 2nd edn (University of the Western Cape, Community Law Centre, 2007) at 234^5.
45 Opening address by the Minister of Housing, L.N. Sisulu, at the Housing Indaba, Cape
Town, 22 September 2005, available at: http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2005/0509
2615451007.htm [last accessed 22 November 2007].
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to the historical and social context of homelessness, the Constitutional Court
has described this legacy as follows:
The problem of homelessness is particularly acute in our society. It is a
direct consequence of apartheid urban planning which sought to exclude
African people from urban areas, and enforced this vision through
policies regulating access to land and housing which meant that far too
little land and too few houses were supplied to African people. The pain-
ful consequences of these policies are still with us eleven years into our
new democracy, despite government’s attempts to remedy them. The frus-
tration and helplessness suffered by many who still struggle against
heavy odds to meet the challenge merely to survive and to have shelter
can never be underestimated. The fact that poverty and homelessness
still plague many South Africans is a painful reminder of the chasm
that still needs to be bridged before the constitutional ideal to establish
a society based on social justice and improved quality of life for all citi-
zens is fully achieved.46
At present, urban and peri-urban squatting, the growth of and overcrowding
in informal settlements and homelessness remain a problematic reality. Due
to inadequate housing, the most socially, economically, environmentally and
politically disadvantaged and vulnerable sectors of the society, including the
poor, women and children, who are engaged in a daily struggle to survive, are
forced to illegally occupy land and abandoned buildings, resulting in evictions
that render them homeless.
Although the scale of evictions at present is smaller than during
apartheid, the problem is still relentless. The sad reality is that these
evictions take place despite the country’s progressive housing laws, policies
and programmes. Hence, any legislation that authorises the eviction of
poor people from their homes, even on justifiable grounds, must be scrutinised
and interpreted in the light of the constitutional aim of addressing this
historical legacy.
B. Legal Context
The Constitution recognises the injustices of the past and aims to heal histori-
cal divisions and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice
and fundamental human rights.47 Its extensive protection of socio-economic
rights represents a commitment to overcome apartheid’s legacy.
46 President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd and Others
2005 (8) BCLR 786 (CC) at para. 36.
47 Preamble to the Constitution.
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The Constitution aims to address the housing and eviction crisis as it guar-
antees the right to have access to adequate housing. Section 26 of the
Constitution states as follows:
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing.
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within
its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this
right.
(3) No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demol-
ished, without an order of court made after considering all the rele-
vant circumstances. No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions.48
It is important to note that Section 26 does not create an entitlement to
immediate implementation free of charge but an entitlement to have ‘access’ to
adequate housing, which the state must progressively realise through reason-
able legislative and other measures. This could limit the judicial protection of
the right. However, the Constitutional Court has noted that a right of access
to housing, as distinct from the right to adequate housing recognised in the
ICESCR, recognises that housing entails more than just ‘bricks and mortar’.
For a person to have access to adequate housing, there must be land, appropri-
ate services such as the provision of water and the removal of sewage, and
the financing of all these, including the building of the house itself.49
Section 26 is aimed at creating a dispensation in which every person has
adequate housing and in which the state may not interfere with such access
unless it would be justifiable to do so. As observed by the Constitutional Court,
Section 26 must be seen as making that decisive break from the past.
It emphasises the importance of adequate housing and in particular
security of tenure in our new constitutional democracy. The indignity
suffered as a result of evictions from homes, forced removals and the
relocation to land often wholly inadequate for housing needs has to be
replaced with a system in which the State must strive to provide access
to adequate housing for all and, where that exists, refrain from permit-
ting people to be removed unless it can be justified.50
48 Other relevant provisions of the Constitution include Section 28(1)(c), guaranteeing every
child the right to basic shelter; Section 35(2)(e), requiring adequate accommodation to be pro-
vided to detained persons, including sentenced prisoners at state expense; Section 25(5),
directing the state to ‘take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available
resources, to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable
basis’; and Section 25(6), further protecting vulnerable groups by reinforcing security of
tenure. Section 25 is relevant for the protection of housing rights and the protection against
arbitrary evictions, because realising the right of access to adequate housing requires avail-
able land and ‘the stronger the right to land, the greater the prospect of a secure home’: see
Port Elizabeth Municipality vVarious Occupiers 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) at para. 19.
49 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom, supra n. 17 at para. 35.
50 Jaftha v Schoeman and Others;Van Rooyen v Stoltz and Others 2005 (1) BCLR 78 (CC) at para. 29.
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This section must, therefore, be interpreted in the light of the values and inter-
ests it seeks to promote in the new constitutional democracy and the historical
injustices it aims to rectify.
The Constitutional Court has interpreted Section 26(1) as placing, at the
very least, a negative obligation on the state, other entities and persons to
desist from preventing or impairing the right of access to adequate housing.51
Hence, any measure that removes from people their pre-existing access to ade-
quate housing limits the right to housing in the Constitution.52
Section 26(2) of the Constitution speaks to the positive obligation imposed
upon the state. It qualifies the right to have access to adequate housing, by
placing a duty on the state to adopt appropriate measures to ensure that this
right is effectively enforced on a progressive basis. The state’s positive obligation
is discussed further below. However, it should be noted that it is not only the
state that is responsible for the provision of housing, but also individuals and
other agents within the society must be enabled by legislative and other mea-
sures to provide housing. Thus, the state’s duty is to create the conditions for
access to adequate housing for people at all economic levels.53
The negative obligation in Section 26(1) is reiterated in Section 26(3) of the
Constitution that prohibits arbitrary evictions. The latter was adopted to
address the injustices and unfair evictions in the past (during apartheid). It
therefore evinces special constitutional regard for a person’s home. According
to the Constitutional Court,
[Section 26(3)] acknowledges that a home is more than just a shelter
from the elements. It is a zone of personal intimacy and family security.
Often it will be the only relatively secure space of privacy and tranquillity
in what (for poor people in particular) is a turbulent and hostile world.
Forced removal is a shock for any family, the more so for one that estab-
lished itself on a site that has become its familiar habitat.54
Subsection (3) has three principal components: (i) a guarantee against the evic-
tion of persons from their homes or the demolition thereof without an order
of court; (ii) the requirement that courts should consider ‘all relevant circum-
stances’ before granting an eviction order; and (iii) a prohibition against
the passing of legislation that permits arbitrary evictions. An eviction may be
arbitrary in two respectsçprocedurally arbitrary because the procedure was
unfair and substantively arbitrary because there are no sufficient reasons for
the eviction.55 Section 26(3) sets out the procedural aspect by explicitly stating
51 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom, supra n. 17 at para. 34.
52 Jaftha v Schoeman and Others;Van Rooyen v Stoltz and Others, supra n. 50 at para. 34.
53 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom, supra n. 17 at para. 36.
54 Port Elizabeth Municipality vVarious Occupiers, supra n. 48 at para. 17.
55 See First National Bank of SA Ltd t/aWesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and
Another 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) at paras 67 and 99^100, which concerned property rights.
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that evictions and demolitions of homes can only occur on the authority of the
court after considering all the relevant circumstances. Substantive aspects,
such as fair and effective notice of eviction proceedings, are dealt with in
other legislation discussed below.
Section 26(3) of the Constitution gave rise to the passing of the Extension of
Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 (ESTA). In its preamble, ESTA acknowledges
that apartheid discriminatory laws and practices have left many South
Africans with no secure tenure of their homes and the land that they use, ren-
dering them vulnerable to unfair eviction. It further recognises the need to
ensure that occupiersçpersons residing on land which belongs to another
personçare not further prejudiced; and for law to regulate the eviction of vul-
nerable occupiers from land in a fair manner, while recognising the right of
landowners to apply to a court for an eviction order in appropriate circum-
stances. In line with the Constitution, Section 9 of ESTA requires a landowner
to get a court order before evicting unlawful occupiers. However, the problem
with ESTA is that it provides protection only to unlawful occupiers who pre-
viously had some form of consent or right to occupy the land in question.
The exclusion of occupiers, who did not have previous consent or right to
occupy the land in question from ESTA, resulted in the enactment of the
Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of
1998 (PIE).56 The PIE was adopted as a means of overcoming abuses and ensur-
ing that evictions take place in a manner that is consistent with the values of
the new constitutional dispensation. The PIE decriminalises squatting. It pro-
vides a framework within which unlawful occupation can be prevented and at
the same time ensuring dignified and individualised treatment of unlawful
occupiers with special consideration for the most vulnerable. It reinforces the
court order requirement under Section 26(3) of the Constitution. Hence, an
eviction may only take place under judicial control.
The eviction process is now subject to a number of procedural and substan-
tive requirements, as PIE provides some legislative texture to guide the courts
in determining the approach to eviction required by Section 26(3) of the
Constitution.57 For instance, Section 4(6) of the PIE requires that before
granting an eviction order, the courts must be of the opinion ‘that it is just
and equitable to do so, after considering all the relevant circumstances, includ-
ing the rights and needs of the elderly, children, disabled persons and house-
holds headed by women’. Section 4(7) goes further to state that the court
must consider, where an occupier has occupied the land in question for more
56 The PIE repealed the PISA under which, once it was determined that the occupiers had no
permission to occupy the land, they faced summary eviction and were liable for criminal
prosecution.
57 Port Elizabeth Municipality vVarious Occupiers, supra n. 48 at para. 24.
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than six months, ‘whether land has been made available or can reasonable be
made available by a Municipality or other organ of state or other landowner
for the relocation of the unlawful occupier’. In addition, Section 6 of PIE deal-
ing with eviction proceedings instituted by an organ of state lists the following
circumstances to be considered in deciding whether to grant an eviction
order: the circumstances under which the unlawful occupier occupied the
land and erected the building or structure; the period the unlawful occupier
and his or her family have resided on the land in question; and the availability
to the unlawful occupier of suitable alternative accommodation or land.58
Other laws that have been enacted to give effect to Section 26 of the
Constitution include the following: the Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of
1994, which protects occupiers of land who have instituted a restitution
claim; the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996, which protects occu-
piers of agricultural (rural) land; the Interim Protection of Informal Land
Rights Act 31 of 1996, which protects occupiers of land in terms of informal
land rights; and the Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999, which protects the housing
rights of occupiers of residential property.
These laws form a web of protection that has considerably improved the
position of previously vulnerable and marginalised groups whose legal rights
to access land and housing were weak or non-existent.59 One of the challen-
ging questions of South Africa’s democracy has been how to translate these
laws and policies into realityçresulting in safe, secure and affordable living
conditions for the poor and vulnerable. The courts play a crucial role in this
regard; ensuring greater protection for those faced with evictions. This has
been done through, inter alia, elaborating on the state’s constitutional obliga-
tion to ensure access to adequate housing for all and the constitutional
requirement to consider relevant circumstances.
58 It should be noted that PIE is currently under revision and the proposed amendments, among
others, seek to repeal the distinction between persons occupying land for less than six
months and persons occupying land for more than six months, as the distinction constitutes
unequal protection of a person’s right not to be evicted as afforded by Section 26(3) of the
Constitution. One of the problematic aspects of the amendments is the proposed narrowing
of the ambit of PIE to exclude some unlawful occupiers, for instance ex-tenants and ex-mort-
gagors, from the protection of PIE, despite the fact that they are not currently protected by
other legislation (see the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of
Land Amendment Bill 2006, South African Government Gazette No. 29501, 22 December
2006). Generally, since its inception, landowners have viewed PIE with disfavour contending
that it interferes with their common law right to instantly evict unlawful occupiers
from their land, as the procedural and substantive requirements of PIE make it difficult,
if not impossible, for them to evict such occupiers (see generally, Christmas, ‘Proposed
Amendments to the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land
Act: A Setback for Vulnerable Occupiers’ (2004) 5 ESR Review 6.
59 De Vos, ‘The Right to Housing’, in Brand and Heyns (eds), supra n. 42 at 94.
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4. The State’s Obligation to Ensure Access to
Adequate Housing for All
The state has a constitutional obligation to ‘respect, protect, promote and fulfil’
the right of access to adequate housing.60 At the very least, this implies that
the state adopts measures aimed at realising this right for all, including those
faced with evictions. The extent of the state’s duty is qualified by three key ele-
ments, set out in Section 26(2) of the Constitution: (i) the obligation to ‘take
reasonable legislative and other measures’; (ii) ‘to achieve the progressive reali-
sation’of the right; and (iii) ‘within available resources’.
A. Reasonable Legislative and Other Measures
The state has an obligation to take steps aimed at realising the right to ade-
quate housing for people from all economic spheres, and the steps taken must
be reasonable. The Constitutional Court has described the standards against
which to evaluate the reasonableness of the state’s measures. The Court
observed that the state could adopt a wide range of measures to meet its obliga-
tions. But the question that remains to be answered is whether the measures
are reasonable. In this regard, the Court observed that, in reviewing compli-
ance with the state’s obligation, a court ‘will not enquire whether other more
desirable or favourable measures could have been adopted, or whether public
money could have been well spent’.61
In order for measures to be reasonable, they must aim at the effective and
expeditious progressive realisation of the right in question, within the states
available resources for implementation. The measures must be comprehensive,
coherent, inclusive, balance, flexible, transparent, be properly conceived and
properly implemented, and make short, medium and long-term provision for
those in desperate need or in crisis situations.The measures must further clearly
set out the responsibilities of the different spheres of government and ensure
that financial and human resources are available for their implementation.
As can be deduced from the above standards, the formulation of a housing
programme is only the first stage in meeting the state’s obligation, as ‘an other-
wise reasonable programme that is not implemented reasonably will not con-
stitute compliance with the state’s obligations’.62 In addition, the programme
must be tailored to the particular context in which it is to applyçwhat may
be appropriate in a rural area may not be appropriate in an urban setting.63
A reasonable programme must also take account of different economic levels
in the society, including those who can afford to pay for housing and those
60 Section 7(2), Constitution.
61 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom, supra n. 17 at para. 41.
62 Ibid. at para. 42.
63 Ibid. at para. 37.
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who cannot. Of particular importance is the requirement that short, medium
and long-term provision must be made for housing needs. Measures aimed at
realising the right to have access to adequate housing, to be reasonable,
cannot ignore those whose housing needs are the most urgent and whose abil-
ity to enjoy all human rights is most in peril.
In the Grootboom case, although the state had a plan for the progressive
realisation of the right to have access to adequate housing and major achieve-
ments had been made, there was a major flaw in its housing programme in
that it did not make reasonable provision for those in desperate need of hous-
ingçthose with no roof over their head, no access to land, and who were
living in intolerable conditions or crisis situations. Consequently, the Court
had to consider whether the government was obliged under Section 26 of the
Constitution to make provision for emergency housing for the respondents
and others in similar circumstances. It held that the state’s programme could
not be said to be reasonable, as it does not cater for those desperately in need
of access to housing in the Cape Metropolitan area. The Court ordered the
state to adopt, implement and supervise a comprehensive and coordinated pro-
gramme that addressed effectively the situation of those desperately in need
of housing.64
The state’s constitutional obligation to make short-term provision for people
in crisis and desperate situations was also considered in the case of City of
Cape Town v Rudolph and Others.65 The case concerned an application brought
by the City of Cape Town (applicant) for the eviction of residents of Valhalla
Park (respondents), an area within the jurisdiction of the applicant. Some of
the respondents had been placed on the housing waiting list of the applicant
as far back as ten years ago. As a result of the over-crowded, intolerable condi-
tions under which they were living at the time, they decided to move onto
vacant land that was owned by the applicant. The applicant subsequently
applied to the High Court for an order of eviction against them.66
64 Following the Grootboom judgment, the Emergency Housing Programme was adopted
(National Department of Housing, National Housing Programme: Housing Assistance in
Emergency Circumstances, April 2004, available at: http://www.housing.gov.za/Content/legis
lation_policies [last accessed 22 November 2007]). The programme aims to assist groups of
people faced with urgent housing problems, such as evictions or threatened evictions, by pro-
viding temporary assistance in the form of municipal grants. Such grants would enable the
Municipality to respond to emergencies by providing secure access to land, boosting infra-
structure and basic services, and improving access to shelter through voluntary relocation
and resettlement. Municipalities are encouraged to assess in advance the emergency housing
needs in their areas and take concrete steps to address them. Sadly, the implementation of
the emergency programme at the provincial level has been very slow. For further discussion
of the Grootboom case, see generally Wesson, ‘Equality and Social Rights: An Exploration in
Light of the South African Constitution’ (2007) Public Law 748.
65 2003 (11) BCLR 1236 (C).
66 Ibid. at 1250I and 1251A-F. The application was based on the common law, as the applicants
contended that the PIE did not apply to the respondents. In the alternative, the applicant
sought urgent relief in terms of the provision on urgent eviction applications in the PIE;
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The respondents not only opposed the application, but also brought a coun-
ter application on the basis that the applicant’s housing policies and pro-
grammes had failed to fulfil its constitutional and statutory obligations to give
effect to their right of access to adequate housing guaranteed in Section 26 of
the Constitution. In particular, they argued that the applicant had failed to
give effect to the Grootboom judgmentçto make short-term provision for
people inValhalla Park who were in crisis and desperate situations.
The application for the eviction of the respondents was dismissed and the
Court found, with regard to the counter application, that the City had failed to
provide any short-term programmes that could meet the housing needs of the
residents of Valhalla Park, an ‘unacceptable disregard for the Constitutional
Court ^ and therefore for the Constitution itself’.67 The Court then ordered the
City of Cape Town to comply with its constitutional obligations to make short-
term provision for people in Valhalla Park who were in crisis and desperate
situations. The City was further required to produce a report within four
months, detailing what steps it had taken to ameliorate the situation, and
what future policies and programmes would be put in place to this end.68
It is important to note that by adopting a reasonableness review approach,
the Constitutional Court has, for the time being, turned a deaf ear to the mini-
mum core obligation approach. The amici curae in the Grootboom case
requested that the right to have access to adequate housing in the
Constitution be interpreted as encompassing an immediate enforceable mini-
mum core obligation on the state.69 But the Court declined to do so stating
that ‘it is not possible to determine a minimum threshold for the progressive
realisation of the right to adequate housing without first identifying the
needs and opportunities for the enjoyment of such a right’.70 This difficulty, as
the Court noted, is compounded by the fact that groups are differently situated
and have varying social needs.71 Nonetheless, the Court acknowledged that
‘there may be cases where it may be possible and appropriate to have regard
to the content of a minimum core obligation to determine whether the
and challenged the PIE’s constitutional validity on the ground that it violates the rights of
property owners. However, the Cape High Court dismissed the challenge to the constitution-
ality of the PIE, holding that it was applicable.
67 Ibid. at 1275C-D, 1280H-J and 1281A-B.
68 Ibid. at 1281C.
69 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom, supra n. 17 at paras 27^9.
The minimum core approach is aimed at protecting the most vulnerable groups of society.
Generally, the approach involves identifying such subsistence levels in respect of each socio-
economic right and insisting that the provision of ‘core’goods and services enjoys immediate
priority. It thus represents a ‘floor’ of immediately enforceable entitlements from which pro-
gressive realisation should proceed. See Pieterse, ‘Resuscitating Socio-Economic Rights:
Constitutional Entitlements to Health Care Services’ (2006) 22 South African Journal on
Human Rights 473 at 481.
70 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom, supra n. 17 at para. 32.
71 Ibid. at paras 32^3.
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measures taken by the State are reasonable’.72 Even if the Grootboom case was
one of such cases, the Court still could not do so because, as it stated, it did not
have sufficient information to determine what would comprise the minimum
core obligation with regard to the right to have access to adequate housing.73
The reasonableness approach has not been without criticisms, including the
fact that it creates a number of difficulties for the enforcement of socio-economic
rights by individuals and groups living in poverty. This difficulty arises from the
fact that the applicants would have to marshal a considerable array of economic
and expert evidence to convince the court that the government’s social policy is
unreasonable, which poor applicants might not be able to do.74
Notwithstanding, the advantage of the reasonableness approach is that it
gives wide latitude to the political branches of government to make the appro-
priate policy choices to meet its socio-economic rights obligations, with the
court’s role being to determine whether they fall within the bounds of ‘reason-
ableness’; thus addressing separation of powers concerns. Also, the fact that
the reasonableness approach is determined on a case-by-case basis and is con-
text sensitive is an advantage in the sense that it creates the on-going possibility
of challenging socio-economic deprivations in the light of changing historical,
social and economic contexts.75 Hence, the standard is not exhaustive.
B. Progressive Realisation of the Right
It is unquestionable that the right to have access to adequate housing cannot
be realised immediately. The Constitutional Court has endorsed the CESCR’s
understanding of the phrase ‘progressive realisation’. In General Comment
No. 3, the CESCR interpreted the term as follows:
The concept of progressive realization constitutes a recognition of the
fact that full realization of all economic, social and cultural rights
will generally not be able to be achieved in a short period of
time . . .Nevertheless, the fact that realization over time, or in other
words progressively, is foreseen under the Covenant should not be
72 Ibid. at para. 33.
73 Ibid. Later, in Minister of Health and Others vTreatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC),
the Court was of the view that the minimum core was incompatible with the institutional
competencies and role of the courts. It held that ‘courts are not institutionally equipped to
make the wide-ranging factual and political enquiries necessary for determining what the
minimum core standards’ should be (at para. 37). This is because, according to the Court, all
the state can do is undertake reasonable measures within its available resources to progres-
sively realise the rights.
74 Liebenberg, ‘Needs, Rights and Transformation: Adjudicating Social Rights in South Africa’
(2005) 6 ESR Review 3 at 6. See also Liebenberg, ‘Basic Rights Claims: How Responsive is
Reasonableness Review?’ (2004) 5 ESR Review 7.
75 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom, supra n. 17 at paras 43^4
and 82^3.
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misinterpreted as depriving the obligation of all meaningful content. It is
on the one hand a necessary flexibility device, reflecting the realities of
the real world and the difficulties involved for any country in ensuring
full realization of economic, social and cultural rights. On the other
hand, the phrase must be read in the light of the overall objective,
indeed the raison d’e“ tre, of the Covenant which is to establish clear obli-
gations for States parties in respect of the full realization of the rights in
question. It thus imposes an obligation to move as expeditiously and
effectively as possible towards that goal. Moreover, any deliberately retro-
gressive measures in that regard would require the most careful consid-
eration and would need to be fully justified by reference to the totality of
the rights provided for in the Covenant and in the context of the full use
of the maximum available resources.76
With reference to the above, the Constitutional Court stated that the term
bears the same meaning in the Constitution.77 The use of the phrase in the
Constitution, therefore, does not mean that the state can drag its feet in meet-
ing its duties or providing the necessary measures to realise the right to ade-
quate housing. Any deliberate retrogressive measures would constitute an
infringement of this right.78
C. Within Available Resources
The rate at which the right to have access to adequate housing is realised and
the reasonableness of measures adopted to achieve this goal are governed by
the state’s available resources. In other words, the availability of resources
would always be an important factor in determining what is reasonable in a
particular case. The phrase ‘within available resources’ implies that the obliga-
tion placed on the state does not require more than its available resources.79
76 General Comment No. 3, supra n. 5 at para. 9.
77 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom, supra n. 17 at para. 45.
78 See Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom, supra n. 17 at para. 45;
Pienaar and Muller, ‘The Impact of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction From and Unlawful
Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 on Homelessness and Unlawful Occupation Within the
Present Statutory Framework’ (1999) 3 Stellenbosch Law Review 370 at 376.
79 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom, supra n. 17 at para. 46.
It should be noted that in some cases, the Constitutional Court has avoided budgetary issues
altogether. For example, in Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu Natal) 1998 (1) SA 765
(CC), the Court simply accepted the state’s contention that resources were limited. This case
concerned a challenge to the resource rationing policy of a state hospital, according to
which Soobramoney, who suffered from chronic renal failure, was excluded from a renal dial-
ysis treatment programme due to his general state of health and the fact that his condition
was irreversible. However, in cases where budgetary issues could not be avoided, the Court
has required the state to persuade it of its financial constraints. For example, in Minister of
Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign, supra n. 73, and Khosa v Minister of Social
Development (2004) 6 SA 505 (CC) at paras 120 and 133, the Court rejected the state’s
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Resources here refer to both the resources within the state and those available
from the international community through international cooperation and
assistance.80
5. The Requirement to Consider Relevant Circumstances
Section 26(3) of the Constitution, as mentioned earlier, requires courts to con-
sider ‘all relevant circumstances’ before deciding whether an eviction should
be ordered. The subsection does not specify the relevant circumstances to be
considered. However, the procedural aspect contemplated in Section 26(3) has
been elaborated upon through legislation as seen above and through judicial
interpretation as discussed subsequently. As mentioned above, PIE for instance,
provides substantive and procedural requirements that guide the courts in
interpreting Section 26(3) of the Constitution.
Initially, the courts did not deem it necessary to define what circumstances
would be regarded as ‘relevant’ in an eviction context. In Ross v South
Peninsula Municipality, the High Court stated that it was beyond the scope of
the appeal to consider what circumstances will be regarded as ‘relevant’ in an
eviction context.81 However, it stated further that some guidance be sought
from Sections 4(6) and 4(7) of PIE dealing with the protection of the rights of
the elderly, children, disabled persons and households headed by women in
an eviction context. The courts’ obligation to consider relevant circumstances
and the fact that PIE provides some guidance as to the sort of circumstances
a court might take into consideration was subsequently confirmed in MEC for
Business Promotion and Property Management, Western Cape v Matthyse.82 In
this case, the Court stated that the aim of Section 26(3) was to mitigate the
harshness of an eviction, meaning that a court can stay or suspend eviction
orders if it is fair and reasonable to do so under the circumstances. Later, the
Supreme Court of Appeal was of the view that for circumstances to be relevant
contention that it did not have the requisite resources. TheTAC case concerned a challenge to
the state’s policy on the prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV, which was chal-
lenged as inconsistent with the right to have access to health care services. The Khosa case
concerned a challenge to the provisions of the Social Assistance Act 59 of 1992 for excluding
people with permanent residence status from accessing social assistance.
80 De Vos, supra n. 59 at 100.
81 2000 (1) SA 589 (C) at 591D. This case was an appeal from the decision of the Magistrate’s
Court. It concerned the impact of Section 26(3) on the common law right of eviction and
the extent to which it placed an onus on the plaintiff to allege relevant circumstances in addi-
tion to those that were relevant at common law. In this case, the Municipality was seeking
an eviction order against Mrs Ross and her children from a flat that she had leased from the
Municipality.
82 2000 (1) All SA 377 (C). This case concerned an eviction application against a number of
families, all former employees of the Western Cape provincial government. The units in
which they lived in were part of their employee benefits, which was now required by the
government for new development.
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for the purposes of Section 26(3), they must be legally relevant.83 This means
the circumstances determined by the relevant law. Subsequently, the Supreme
Court of Appeal added that the circumstances under PIE (mentioned under
‘3B Legal Context’ Section above) should be taken into account.84
The Constitutional Court observed that the inclusion of the requirement to
consider all relevant circumstances serves a clear constitutional purpose.
According to the Court,
The statement in the Constitution that the courts must do what courts
are normally expected to do, namely, take all relevant factors into
account, would appear otiose (superfluous), even odd. Its use in s 26(3),
however, serves a clear constitutional purpose. It is there precisely to
underline how non-prescriptive the provision is intended to be. The way
in which the courts are to manage the process has, accordingly, been
left as wide open as constitutional language could achieve, by design
and not by accident, by deliberate purpose and not by omission.85
It is not easy to classify the multitude of places and relationships
involved. This is precisely why, even though unlawfulness is established,
the eviction process is not automatic and why the courts are called
upon to exercise a broad judicial discretion on a case by case basis.86
This was in the PE Municipality case, which concerned an eviction application
by the state (in particular, the Port Elizabeth Municipality) against 68 people,
including 23 children (occupiers), who had illegally occupied private undeve-
loped land within the Municipality’s jurisdiction. The application was based on
Section 6 of PIE, which states that an organ of state may institute proceedings
for the eviction of an unlawful occupier within its area of jurisdiction.The occu-
piers had been living on the land for periods ranging from two to eight years.
Most of them had moved onto the land after being evicted from previously occu-
pied land. The occupiers indicated that they were willing to vacate the property,
provided that they were given suitable alternative land to which they could
move. However, the occupiers had rejected a proposal made by the
Municipality that they move to identified land on the basis of lack of security of
tenure, thus making them liable to further eviction. The Municipality argued
that giving them alternative land would be preferential treatment; it would dis-
rupt the existing housing programme and would be ‘queue-jumping’ by the
occupiers. The Municipality did not engage in any discussions with the occu-
piers to identify their particular circumstances or needs.
83 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) at para. 42. This case concerned an eviction application
by a private owner in respect of a tenant who had breached her lease.
84 See generally, Ndlovu v Ngcobo 2003 (1) SA 113 (SCA).
85 Port Elizabeth Municipality vVarious Occupiers, supra n. 48 at para. 22.
86 Ibid. at para. 31.
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As noted further by the Court in this case, one of the circumstances in
deciding whether an eviction would be just and equitable would be whether
mediation has been tried.87 The Court, while observing that the state’s duties
extend beyond the development of housing schemes to treating those within
their jurisdiction with respect, stated that ‘where the need to evict people
arises, some attempts to resolve the problem before seeking a court order will
ordinarily be required’.88 It went further to add that ‘a court involved in future
litigation involving occupiers should be reluctant to accept that it would be
just and equitable to order their eviction if it is not satisfied that all reasonable
steps had been taken to get an agreed, mediated solution’.89 The extent to
which serious negotiations have taken place with equality of voice for all con-
cerned is therefore a relevant factor to be considered in determining whether
it is just and equitable to grant an eviction order. In the Grootboom case, as
well, emphasis was placed on the need for meaningful consultation with indi-
viduals and communities affected by housing development.90
The importance of mediation as affirmed in PE Municipality was recently
emphasised in Lingwood Michael and Another v The Unlawful Occupiers of R/E of
Erf 9 Highlands.91 The Court noted the necessity and importance of parties
involved in litigation instituted under PIE to engage in mediation in an endea-
vour to achieve mutually acceptable solutions.92 Since the parties in the case
had not engaged in any negotiations or attempted any mediation ‘in an
attempt to exploring (sic) all reasonable possibilities of securing suitable
alternative accommodation or land and/or of achieving solutions mutually
acceptable to the parties’, the Court accordingly refused an eviction order
and postponed the matter sine die, and ordered the joinder of the City of
Johannesburg (the Municipality) by virtue of its constitutional and statutory
duties and the commencement of mediation.93 The Constitutional Court has
made a similar order in the case of Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township
and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg and Others.94
87 Ibid. at para. 45.
88 Ibid. at para. 56.
89 Ibid. at para. 61.
90 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom, supra n. 17 at para. 84.
91 Case No. 2006/16243 (WLD), 2007, unreported, which concerned a private eviction brought in
terms of PIE.
92 Ibid. at para. 33.
93 Ibid. at para. 37^8.
94 Case No: CCT 24/07, Interim Order, 30 August 2007. This case raised the difficult issue of how
to reconcile respect for the inadequate accommodation which people living on the margins
(desperately poor people) have managed to secure, and the statutory powers and duties of
local authorities to ensure that conditions of accommodation do not constitute a threat to
the safety of these persons. It concerned several applications in which the Municipality
sought the eviction of over 300 people (the occupiers) from six properties in the inner city of
Johannesburg. The Municipality (the applicant) justified the eviction on the basis of Section
12(4)(b), National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act 103 of 1977 (NBRA),
which gives it statutory powers and duties to prevent dangerous living conditions in its area
of jurisdiction. The occupiers opposed the eviction application, and urged the Court to declare
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The Court ordered the City of Johannesburg and the applicants to engage with
each other meaningfully and as soon as it was possible in an effort to resolve
the differences and difficulties raised in the case in the light of the values of
the Constitution, the constitutional and statutory duties of the Municipality
and the rights and duties of the citizens concerned. The Court further
requested the parties to file affidavits after over a month reporting the results
of their engagement, which it would take into account in the preparation of
its judgment.
Another relevant circumstance that the Court in PE Municipality looked at
was the availability of suitable alternative accommodation. In this regard, the
Court stated that the real question in the case was whether the Municipality
had considered seriously or at all the request of the occupiers that they be pro-
vided with suitable alternative land upon which they could live ‘without fear
of eviction’ until provided with housing by the Municipality.95
The Court then found that it was not just and equitable to evict the occu-
piers given the following: (i) the lengthy period during which the occupiers
had lived on the land in question; (ii) the fact that there was no evidence that
either the Municipality or the owners of the land needed to evict the occupiers
in order to put the land to some other productive use; (iii) the absence of any
significant attempts by the Municipality to listen to and consider the problems
of this particular group of occupiers; and (iv) the fact that this was a relatively
small group of people who appeared to be genuinely homeless and in need.96
In a nutshell, the PE Municipality case highlights a number of circum-
stances to be considered when deciding on whether or not to grant an eviction
order. These include: (i) the manner in which the occupation was effected;
(ii) the duration of the occupation; (iii) the availability of suitable alternative
accommodation or land; (iv) reasonableness of offers made in connection with
suitable alternative accommodation or land; (v) the timescales proposed rela-
tive to the degree of disruption involved; (vi) the willingness of the occupiers
to respond to reasonable alternatives put before them; (vii) the extent to
the practice of securing evictions by reliance on the NBRA unconstitutional, and also sought
a declaration that the Municipality’s housing programme fails to comply with its constitu-
tional and statutory obligations, as it does not cater for those in desperate need. The occupiers
also sought an interdict preventing the Municipality from seeking to evict them until suitable
alternative accommodation was provided, bringing the Municipality into compliance with
its constitutional obligations. The High Court interdicted the Municipality from seeking to
evict the occupiers pending the implementation of a comprehensive housing programme, or
until such time as suitable adequate alternative accommodation could be provided. However,
the Supreme Court of Appeal upheld the Municipality’s right in terms of the NBRA to evict
residents of ‘bad buildings’ when it deems it necessary for health and safety reasons, which
is not dependent upon it being able to provide alternative accommodation to the occupants.
The occupiers then appealed to the Constitutional Court. This case is discussed further
below: see City of Johannesburg Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others, infra n. 120 and infra
n. 123.
95 Port Elizabeth Municipality vVarious Occupiers, supra n. 48 at para. 58.
96 Ibid. at para. 59.
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which serious negotiations have taken place with equality of voice for all con-
cerned; and (viii) the gender, age, occupation or lack thereof and state of
health of those affected.97
An additional relevant circumstance that was highlighted in Grootboom is
the manner of execution of the eviction order, that is, whether it was executed
humanely. In this regard, the Court held that the state had an obligation to
ensure, at the very least, that the eviction was executed humanely. The fact
that the eviction was carried out a day early and that the possessions and
building materials of the respondents (the unlawful occupiers) were destroyed
and burnt amounted to a breach of the negative obligation embodied in the
right of access to adequate housing recognised under Section 26(1) of the
Constitution.98
Furthermore, the interests of surrounding communities as well as the nega-
tive impact of ‘land gaps’ on investor-confidence in the country, and the right
of landowners (discussed subsequently), have been regarded by the courts as
relevant factors.99
It is important to note that the above circumstances are not exhaustive,
requiring a degree of appreciation of the specific situation of each case. The
subsequent paragraphs consider in more detail two of the above relevant cir-
cumstancesçthe availability of alternative accommodation and balancing the
various interests involved, in particular, the right to adequate housing of
those faced with eviction and the rights of landowners. The former factor is
usually a critical issue when it comes to evictions as, more often than not,
evictions result in homelessness. The latter factor involves balancing the
constitutional rights of landowners and unlawful occupiers, as it is also an
important duty of the court to ensure that it protects not just the interest of
unlawful occupiers but also that of the landowners.
A. The Availability of Suitable Alternative Accommodation or Land
The importance of the availability of alternative accommodation arises not just
from the constitutional guarantee to have access to adequate housing and the
related state duty but also from the right to human dignity,100 as the state has
an obligation to ensure that evictions are executed humanely. This factor is
therefore relevant, at the very least, to the question whether an eviction may
97 Ibid. at paras 25^30, 33 and 53.
98 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom, supra n. 17 at para. 88.
99 Groengras Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd v Elandsfontein Unlawful Occupants and Others 2002 (1) SA
125 (T) at para. 32. Other circumstances considered in this case include: the blatant invasion
of the land, the short duration of the stay on the property, the probability that the occupants
would be able to return to where they had come from, and the irreversible loss to the appli-
cants should the eviction order be granted.
100 Section 10 of the Constitution provides that ‘everyone has inherent dignity and the right to
have their dignity respected and protected’.
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be humanely executed. In this regard, the Supreme Court of Appeal has stated
as follows:
To the extent that we are concerned with the execution of the court
order, Grootboom made it clear that the government has an obligation to
ensure, at the very least, that evictions are executed humanely. As must
be abundantly clear by now, the order cannot be executed ^ humanely
or otherwise ^ unless the state provides some land.101
In similar vein, the CESCR has stated that, prior to carrying out any evictions,
and particularly those involving large groups, states must ensure that all feasi-
ble alternatives are explored in consultation with the affected persons, with a
view to avoiding, or at least minimising, the need to use force.102 The CESCR
went further to state:
Evictions should not result in individuals being rendered homeless or
vulnerable to the violation of other human rights. Where those affected
are unable to provide for themselves, the State party must take all appro-
priate measures, to the maximum of its available resources, to ensure
that adequate alternative housing, resettlement or access to productive
land, as the case may be, is available.103
In the South African context, there is no unqualified constitutional duty on
the state to ensure that in no circumstances should an eviction take place
unless alternative suitable accommodation or land is made available.
However, as a signatory to the Habitat Agenda, South Africa has committed
itself to providing, as appropriate, alternative solutions when evictions are
unavoidable.104
The Constitutional Court has been at pains in all its judgments in eviction
cases in emphasising the provision of alternative accommodation for vulner-
able groups (those in desperate need), even if temporary, as a significant
factor. It has stated that ‘a court should be reluctant to grant an eviction
against relatively settled occupiers unless it is satisfied that a reasonable alter-
native is available, even if only as an interim measure pending ultimate
access to housing in the formal housing programme’.105 Moreover, it has said:
‘The availability of suitable alternative accommodation or land is one of the
101 Modderfontein Squatters, Greater Benoni City Council v Modderklip Boedery (Pty) Ltd; President
of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2004 (8) BCLR 821
(SCA) at para. 26.
102 General Comment No. 7, supra n. 25 at para. 13.
103 General Comment No. 7, supra n. 25 at para. 16.
104 Habitat Agenda, Adopted by the 2nd United Nations Conference on Human Settlements
(Habitat II), Istanbul, 1996, at paras 40(n) and 98(b); and Groengras Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd v
Elandsfontein Unlawful Occupants and Others, supra n. 99 at para. 28.
105 Port Elizabeth Municipality vVarious Occupiers, supra n. 48 at para. 28.
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factors, if not the most important factor for a Court to have regard to in deter-
mining whether it is just and equitable to issue an eviction order’.106
The provision of alternative accommodation is evaluated on a case-by-case
basis as it also depends on the number of people, their age, and whether they
can provide for themselves. This means that, in some instances, the court
may order an eviction where the result is homelessness. These include: where
the occupation creates a genuinely urgent or pressing danger;107 where a
group of homeless people is chosen over another who seek access to the same
land;108 where the occupation of the land is intended to coerce a state struc-
ture into providing housing on a preferential basis;109 and the eviction of
people living in informal settlements.110
However, the provision of alternative accommodation is an important factor
to be considered where settled occupiers are to be evicted, especially if they
are not at fault, and the result of the eviction will be homelessness. In har-
mony with the international understanding of the obligation imposed on
states to respect and protect human rights, recent South African jurisprudence
demonstrates that the duty to respect and protect the right to have access to
adequate housing necessarily implies a right to alternative accommodation
on eviction, where the evictees are not able to obtain this through their own
effort.111 It could therefore be argued that a ‘right’ to alternative accommoda-
tion for those in desperate need has developed. As observed in Grootboom and
Rudolph above, the state’s constitutional duty to adopt reasonable measures to
ensure that people gain access to adequate housing entails providing short-
term relief for people living in crisis situations or intolerable conditions. The
Court in Grootboom did not rule specifically on alternative accommodation
since the government, after the community had approached the Court, offered
them alternative accommodation.112 However, the Court later confirmed the
undertakings made by the Western Cape provincial government and the
Municipality in relation to providing temporary accommodation for the com-
munity, sanitation and basic services and water (in an interlocutory order).
In PE Municipality, as noted above, the availability of suitable alternative land
106 Lingwood Michael and Another vThe Unlawful Occupiers of R/E of Erf 9 Highlands, supra n. 91, at
para. 18.
107 Groengras Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd v Elandsfontein Unlawful Occupants and Others, supra 99 at
141 B-E.
108 City of Cape Town and Another v The Occupiers of Erf 4832 Philippi, CPD Case No. 57 (Pty) Ltd v
Elandsfontein Unlawful Occupants and Others, 46/2000, unreported at 12, per Brand.
109 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom, supra n. 17 at para. 92.
110 Port Elizabeth Municipality vVarious Occupiers, supra n. 48 at para. 21.
111 Budlender, ‘The Right to Alternative Accommodation in Forced Evictions’, in Squires et al.
(eds), The Road to a Remedy: Current Issues in The Litigation of Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2005) 127 at 136.
112 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom, supra n. 17 at para. 91.
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was an important consideration in establishing whether the state had
responded reasonably to the dire situation of the occupiers in question.113
Another case that reinforces the constitutional protection of people against
the loss of their homes without alternatives is Jaftha. This case was a challenge
to the constitutionality of the Magistrates’ Court Act that permitted the sale in
execution of people’s homes in order to satisfy debts. The effect of the sale
in execution would be the eviction of people from their homes, without the
provision of suitable alternative accommodation. The Constitutional Court held
that, at the very least, any measure which permits a person to be deprived of
existing access to adequate housing limits the rights protected in Section 26.114
Considering, inter alia, the issue of security of tenure in the light of the historical
context, the Court interpreted and read words into the Magistrates’ Court Act
to ensure that people’s homes can only be sold if a court has ordered so after
considering all the relevant circumstances.115 One of the considerations would,
of course, be the availability of suitable alternative accommodation.116
In the Modderklip case, the Constitutional Court held that the residents were
entitled to occupy the land in question until alternative land was made avail-
able to them by the state or the provincial local authority.117 This case con-
cerned a private landowner’s efforts to execute an eviction order granted
against about 40,000 people who, as a result of overcrowding and shortage of
land near their informal settlement, illegally moved onto his land. The land-
owner was unsuccessful in getting various organs of state to assist him in
enforcing an eviction order granted by the High Court. The Supreme Court of
Appeal held that the state breached its constitutional obligation to both the
landowner and the unlawful occupiers by failing to provide alternative accom-
modation to the occupiers upon eviction; and that the occupiers were entitled
to occupy the land until alternative accommodation was made available to
them by the state or the provincial or local authority.118 Similarly, on appeal
to the Constitutional Court, it held, inter alia, that the occupiers were entitled
to occupy the land until then.119
113 Port Elizabeth Municipality vVarious Occupiers, supra n. 48 at para. 58.
114 Jaftha v Schoeman and Others;Van Rooyen v Stoltz and Others, supra n. 50 at paras 34 and 39.
115 Ibid. at paras 52^67.
116 The Court stated further that every effort should be made to find creative alternatives that
allow for debt recovery but which use execution only as a last resort; Jaftha v Schoeman and
Others;Van Rooyen v Stoltz and Others, supra n. 50 at para. 59.
117 Modderfontein Squatters, Greater Benoni City Council v Modderklip Boedery (Pty) Ltd; President
of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd, supra n. 46 at
para. 68.
118 See generally, Modderfontein Squatters, Greater Benoni City Council v Modderklip Boedery (Pty)
Ltd; President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd, supra
n. 101 at para. 52. See also Christmas, ‘Property Rights vs Socio-Economic Rights of
Occupiers’ (2004) 5 ESR Review 11.
119 The Court also found that, by failing to do anything to stop the occupation of the land and
assist in enforcing the eviction order, the state infringed the landowner’s right to an effective
remedy as required by the rule of law.
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Recently, the provision of alternative accommodation for people in desperate
need was one of the key issues in the case City of Johannesburg v Rand
Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others.120 The High Court situated the right to have
access to adequate housing alongside the right to work and to a livelihood,
even though the right to a livelihood is not expressly guaranteed in the South
African Constitution.121 According to the Court, the right of access to adequate
housing implies a right to housing at a specific location within a reasonable
distance of livelihood opportunities. The High Court then dismissed the
Municipality’s eviction application, holding that its housing programme failed
to comply with its constitutional and statutory obligations, by failing to pro-
vide suitable relief for those in desperate need of accommodation. The Court
further directed the Municipality to devise and implement a comprehensive
and coordinated programme to progressively realise the right to adequate
housing for the desperately poor of Johannesburg. Finally, as noted earlier,
the Court issued an interdict against the Municipality from seeking to evict
the occupiers pending the implementation of the comprehensive housing
program, or until such time as suitable adequate alternative accommodation
could be provided.122
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeal upheld the Municipality’s right in
terms of the NBRA to evict residents of ‘bad buildings’ when it deemed it
necessary for health and safety reasons, which was not dependent upon it
being able to provide alternative accommodation to the occupants.123
Contrary to the High Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal was of the view
that the alternative accommodation must not be at a specific locationçin this
case, the inner city of Johannesburgças the Constitution does not give a
person a right to housing at state expense at a locality of that person’s
choice.124 It would have been challenging if the Court had ordered specifically
that the alternative accommodation must be in the inner city, considering,
amongst other matters, the general difficulties in finding available land espe-
cially in urban areas. Notwithstanding, as pointed out by the Court, though
not in the Constitution the state has a duty to give due regard to the relation-
ship between location of residence and the place where persons can earn or
try to earn their living.125 Subsequently, the Court ordered the Municipality
to provide temporary accommodation to those residents who had been evicted
120 City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others 2006 (6) BCLR 728 (W).
121 Ibid. at para. 64.
122 Ibid. at para. 67. For further discussion of the High Court case, see Chenwi, ‘Advancing the
Right to Adequate Housing of Desperately Poor People: City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties
(Pty) Ltd and Others’ (2006) 14 Human Rights Brief 13.
123 City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others 2007 (6) BCLR 643 (SCA) at paras 5
and 78.
124 Ibid. at para. 44.
125 Ibid.
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and were in desperate need of housing assistance.126 The Court went further
to state that the temporary accommodation should consist of at least the fol-
lowing elements: (i) a place where they might live secure against eviction;
(ii) a structure that was waterproof and secure against the elements; and
(iii) access to basic sanitation, water and refuse services.127 This aspect of the
Court’s decision affirms the constitutional commitment to establishing a
society that values human dignity and requires everyone to be treated with
care and concern.
As noted above, this case was further appealed to the Constitutional Court,
which, after hearing the various arguments, issued an interim order directing
the parties to ‘engage with each other meaningfully . . . in an effort to resolve
the differences and difficulties aired in this application’ and to alleviate the
plight of the applicants who live in the two buildings concerned in this applica-
tion by making the buildings as safe and as conducive to health as is reason-
ably practicable’.128
The parties have reached an agreement, which involves providing the occu-
piers with alternative accommodation in the inner city of Johannesburg.
First, the parties agreed on a range of interim measures to improve the condi-
tions in the two buildings in question pending relocation to the alternative
accommodation. These include the provision of toilets, portable water, waste
disposal services and fire extinguishers, as well as a once-off operation to
clean and sanitise the properties, all at the Municipality’s own expense.
Second, the parties agreed that the occupiers will be provided with alternative
accommodation in the inner city of Johannesburg. Similar to the Supreme
Court of Appeal’s ruling, the alternative accommodation will consist of at
least the following elements: (i) security against eviction; (ii) access to sanita-
tion; (iii) access to portable water; and (iv) access to electricity for heating,
lighting and cooking. The occupiers are to occupy the alternative accommoda-
tion until suitable permanent housing solutions can be developed for them.
The nature and location of the permanent housing options will be developed
by the Municipality in consultation with the occupiers. The agreement has
been endorsed by the Constitutional Court129 and accentuates the importance
of the provision of suitable alternative accommodation in eviction cases, espe-
cially for those who are desperately poor, vulnerable and cannot therefore pro-
vide for themselves.
Notwithstanding, a number of issues raised in the application remain
outstanding. These include but are not limited to the following: (i) the
126 Ibid.
127 Ibid. at para. 78(2.1).
128 The Rand Properties case is cited in the Constitutional Court as Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road,
Berea Township, and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg and Others,
supra n. 94.
129 Case No: CCT 24/07, Order dated 5 November 2007.
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constitutionality of the relevant section of the NBRA; (ii) the practice to be
adopted by the Municipality in dealing with persons occupying ‘bad buildings’
in the future; (iii) the applicability of PIE; (iv) the reach and applicability of
Section 26 of the Constitution; and (v) the question whether, at the time the
litigation was launched, the City had formulated and implemented a reason-
able plan to progressively realise the rights of access to adequate housing of
the occupiers and the class of persons they represent. The residual issues aris-
ing from the parties’ reports will be considered in the Court’s judgment.130
B. Balancing Interests in Eviction Cases
Thus, in eviction proceedings, when considering relevant circumstances as
required under Section 26(3) of the Constitution, courts must consider the
interest of both the unlawful occupiers and the landowner. In fact, one of the
objectives of PIE is to strike a balance between a landowner’s right to evict
unlawful occupiers and the occupiers’ right to have access to adequate housing
and be protected from arbitrary eviction. Hence, where there is a clash
between housing and property rights, courts have to ensure a balance between
the housing rights of unlawful occupiers and the property rights of the
owner of a land. The state has a duty to seek to satisfy both rights.131 The
courts have developed a strategic and philosophical framework where there is
a clash between housing rights and property rights. The Kyalami Ridge, PE
Municipality and Modderklip cases are illustrative of the attempts by the
courts to establish an appropriate relationship between property rights
(Section 25 of the Constitution)132 and the right to have access to adequate
housing including the protection from arbitrary evictions.
In the Kyalami Ridge case,133 the decision of the government to house a
group of flood victims on land belonging to it was challenged by residents in
the vicinity.134 Although the case did not deal directly with Section 25 of the
Constitution, the Constitutional Court noted that the interests of both the
flood victims and the environmental and property interests of the residents
130 Ibid. At the time of writing, judgment was pending.
131 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom, supra n. 17 at para. 74.
132 Section 25(1), Constitution states: ‘No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law
of general application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property.’
133 Minister of PublicWorks and Others v Kyalami Ridge Environmental Association and Others 2001
(7) BCLR 652 (CC).
134 This was a case in which severe floods displaced people in Alexandra Township. As a tempo-
rary measure, the government wanted to assist the affected people by establishing a transit
camp on a state-owned land, with the aim of moving the people to permanent housing once
it became available. This plan was made without discussions with residents near the area of
the transit camp. The residents’ association challenged the government’s plan on the ground
that it was not supported by legislation, and that it contravened a town planning scheme,
and land and environmental legislation.
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have to be taken into account in the decision-making process.135 The Court
stated that the fact that property values in the vicinity may be affected by
low-cost housing cannot in the circumstances of the case stand in the way of
the constitutional obligation that government has to address the needs of
homeless people, and its decision to use its own property for that purpose.136
The Court then held that the decision by government to establish a temporary
camp was lawful as it was intended to give effect to its constitutional obligation
to provide access to adequate housing.
In the PE Municipality case, the Constitutional Court noted that the use of
the term ‘just and equitable’ in the eviction legislation (PIE) relates to both the
interests of landowners and of unlawful occupiers. While acknowledging the
complexities involved in balancing these interestsçthe constitutional rights
of landowners and unlawful occupiersçthe Court pointed out three salient
features of the way the Constitution approaches the interrelationship between
land, homelessness, hunger and respect for property rights: First, the rights of
the dispossessed in relation to land are not generally in unqualified terms as
rights intended to be immediately self-enforcing, presuppose, in the main, the
adoption of legislative and other measures to strengthen the rights.137
Secondly, people living in informal settlements may be evicted, even if it results
in loss of a home.138 Thirdly, there is the need to seek concrete and case-specific
solutions to the difficult problems that arise.139 Hence, where there is a clash
between property rights and the genuine despair of people in dire need of
accommodation, the judicial function is not to establish a hierarchical arrange-
ment between the different interests involved. Put differently, the judicial func-
tion is not to automatically privilege in an abstract and mechanical way
property rights over the housing rights of those affected.140 In such instances,
as stated by the Constitutional Court, the function of the court is ‘to balance
out and reconcile the opposed claims in as just a manner as possible taking
account of all the interests involved and the specific factors relevant in each
case’.141 Therefore, the state must show equal accountability to occupiers and
landowners. If, for instance, the state fails to provide alternative land in an evic-
tion case in which it should have done so, it breaches its constitutional duty to
both the landowner and unlawful occupiers. Accordingly, the Court in PE
Municipality found that it was not just and equitable to evict the occupiers.142
135 Minister of Public Works and Others v Kyalami Ridge Environmental Association and Others,
supra n. 133 at paras 103, 105 and 106.
136 Ibid. at para. 107.
137 Port Elizabeth Municipality vVarious Occupiers, supra n. 48 at paras 20.
138 Ibid. at para. 21.
139 Ibid. at para. 22.
140 Ibid. at para. 23.
141 President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Modderklip Boedery (Pty) Ltd and Others,
supra n. 46 at para. 22.
142 Ibid. at para. 58.
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The Modderklip case posed a clear conflict between the duty of the state to
protect the landowner’s property rights and its duty to provide access to ade-
quate housing. The Supreme Court of Appeal held in this case that, by failing
to provide alternative accommodation to the occupiers upon eviction, the
state breached its constitutional obligation to both the landowner and the
unlawful occupiers.143 On appeal to the Constitutional Court, the state’s main
contentions were the following: First, it challenged the finding by the
Supreme Court of Appeal that the landowner’s right to property and the occu-
piers’ rights to have access to adequate housing had been breached. Second,
the state argued that the landowner was not entitled to the relief it claimed
because it had neglected to apply for an urgent eviction order in good time.144
The Court did not engage with arguments regarding violations of the land-
owner’s right to property. Rather, it focussed on the second contention. The
Court was of the opinion that it is unreasonable to force the landowner to
bear the burden that is on the state of providing the occupiers with accommo-
dation.145 However, the Court found that, by failing to do anything to stop the
occupation of the land and assist in enforcing the eviction order, the state
infringed the landowner’s right to an effective remedy as required by the rule
of law and entrenched in Section 34 of the Constitution.146 Although the
Court did not deal with the landowner’s property rights, its judgment confirms
that, in eviction cases, the rights of landownersçbe it the right to property or
other rightsçhave to be balanced with the right to have access to adequate
housing of unlawful occupiers.
6. Conclusion
Courts do have an important role in enforcing the right to adequate housing,
especially in the context of an eviction. Judicial oversight is crucial in ensuring
that constitutional rights are adequately enforced, that evictions are justifiable,
and that all the relevant circumstances are taken into account before resort is
had to such a drastic measure that causes social disruption and has negative
impacts on a range of human rights. The legislative provisions on the rights
to adequate housing and to protection from forced evictions form the skeleton,
which the courts add flesh to by expanding on the provisions, resulting in
safe, secure and affordable living conditions for the poor and vulnerable. The
South African constitutional jurisprudence also advances what the right to
143 Modderfontein Squatters, Greater Benoni City Council v Modderklip Boedery (Pty) Ltd; President
of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd, supra n. 101 at
para. 52.
144 Ibid. at para. 22.
145 Ibid. at para. 45.
146 Ibid. at para. 51.
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have access to adequate housing entails. Housing means a lot more than a roof
over one’s head. For a person to have access to adequate housing, there must
be land, the house itself, services such as the provision of water and the
removal of sewage and the financing of these. In addition, it is not only the
state that is responsible for providing housing. Other people and structures
within our society must be permitted by legislative and other measures to pro-
vide housing. This is because the state’s duty is to create the conditions for
access to adequate housing for people at all economic levels of a society.
South African courts have made significant progress in ensuring greater
protection for those faced with eviction, while, at the same time, recognising
the rights of landowners. A positive aspect of the jurisprudence of the
courts is its use of international law in non-binding international instruments.
The constitutional jurisprudence is in fact consistent with the international
framework as it underscores most of the international standards on evictions.
The courts’approach is similar to that of the CESCR, requiring a high standard
of justification for forced evictions. It is evident from the jurisprudence that
the state has a duty to ensure that an eviction is carried out humanely. If the
eviction results in possessions and building materials being destroyed and
burnt, it could constitute a violation of the state’s duty to provide access to ade-
quate housing.
Notwithstanding, the eviction problem in South Africa is still an issue that
one should be particularly concerned about. Due to poor implementation of
certain laws and policies as well as of court judgments, the sad reality is that
many people are still faced with the threat of evictions. In this regard, at the
end of his mission to South Africa in April 2007, the UN Special Rapporteur
on adequate housing criticised the practice of forced evictions in the country
as it renders people homeless; and called for a moratorium on evictions until
all national, provincial and local legislation, policies and administrative
actions are brought into line with constitutional provisions and relevant
constitutional court judgments that protect the right to adequate housing and
freedom from evictions.147
The South African experience shows that having a myriad of progressive
laws and policies on housing rights and evictions is not sufficient, as their
actual enforcement is the most vital facet. Though courts do have an impor-
tant role in ensuring adequate enforcement of the rights to adequate housing
and to protection from forced evictions, the impact is limited if their decisions
are not enforced adequately.
147 Supra n. 15.
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